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                                                          Abstract 
 
This article examines the role  military intelligence played  in the  Dhofar 
campaign between 1970-1976. Drawing on an array of sources,  it 
examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in 
prosecuting   a successful operational campaign against a Marxist 
inspired insurgency,  but equally, the importance that intelligence played 
in consolidating the Al-Bu-Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar 
itself, the material benefits to be had  from the discovery and production 
of oil had yet to be realised.  
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 Introduction 
It remains a truism that the acquisition and use of intelligence, as well as  developing  
and maintaining  the required machinery to sustain  its  timely production   is integral to the 
prosecution of any successful counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign. Given this recognition, it 
is perhaps surprising that even today amid the vast array of literature dealing with COIN,  
relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to the role played by intelligence, and 
in particular military intelligence  in campaigns where perhaps time and distance have 
served to assuage certain sensitivities.  The Dhofar campaign remains a case in point.  How 
the campaign was fought and the extent of British involvement was long been dominated by 
narratives that highlight the role played by the British 22 Special Air Service Regiment (22 
SAS), a role that while seen as  important – not least in the  training and operations of the 
Firqat -  has  tended to overshadow the  wider contribution and role of the Sultan’s Armed 
Forces (SAF) who undertook the bulk of the fighting on the Jebel.1 
  More recently, a sense of balance has been restored. The  crucial role played by 
British officers serving on secondment with the SAF  has increasingly been recognised, not 
least in the excellent study by Ian Gardiner, In the Service of the Sultan. Even so, discussion 
of the crucial role played by military intelligence remains conspicuous by its absence, a sin of 
omission that even extends to  the current British Army Field Manual on COIN that 
otherwise extols the Dhofar campaign as ‘one of the most successful counter insurgency 
operations in the twentieth century’  and whose lessons are again being studied and 
digested by the British, Australian, US and Canadian armed forces.2  Only one systematic  
study has ever appeared that analyses the evolution of intelligence structures in Oman 
throughout this period, a study that while informed by a historic narrative, remains focused 
on the ethnographic evolution of Oman’s intelligence services from its dependence on 
British tutelage to its control by indigenous expertise  by  the 1990s.3 
 This omission is even more surprising when one considers that the current lexicon 
applied to describe intelligence led operations in Afghanistan  - the human terrain, 
intelligence preparation of the environment and ‘areas of intelligence interest’  -  is a 
vocabulary that can equally be used to frame and understand events in Dhofar some four 
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decades previously and in particular how tribes across Dhofar were  suborned  as part of a 
wider attempt to fragment and eventually defeat an insurgency.  
Such analogies aside  however, the campaign in Dhofar is perhaps unique in one 
important respect:  it stands alone as  an example where military  intelligence went beyond 
its functional task of providing timely information to the SAF; rather, it played an important 
role, hitherto overlooked in securing the state,  helping to  shape constructs of legitimacy 
among tribal groupings  - such as the Qara (the original jebalis)  Bayt Kathir and the Mahra  
centred on the denial of the other -  that is  framing tribal sentiment around a rejection of 
the secular  Marxist orientation  of Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) -  rather than necessarily accentuating  the positive virtues of 
supporting a  dynastic  order – the al-Bu Said -  whose material largesse had yet to be fully 
realised.4   As such,  the traditional (and often simplistic) emphasis on  ‘hearts and minds’  
that conflates political loyalty  with  material wellbeing   in deciding popular support 
requires some qualification in the case of the Dhofar campaign. In particular, how military 
intelligence came to understand and manipulate  the tribal nature of the insurgency – the 
human terrain and its shifting loyalties  -  and how in turn this helped shape assessments of 
the operational environment  remains an underexplored yet critical element of wider 
operations undertaken by the SAF that eventually defeated the guerrillas.  This was no mean 
achievement in a country where, according to the Brigadier John Graham, commanding 
officer of the SAF between 1970-1972, ‘patriotism’, let alone loyalty   was a ‘rare 
characteristic’.5 
Based on archival sources, private papers, oral archives and interviews with former 
intelligence officials,   this article begins by   examining the intelligence deficit faced by the 
British at the start of the Dhofar campaign, a deficit which for the most  was actually  not 
fully addressed until 1975. Even so,  the establishment of an effective ‘intelligence cycle’  
with the arrival of personnel from the British Army’s Intelligence Corps in 1970 allowed the 
human terrain to be both understood, mapped  and exploited properly for the first time, a 
process whose impact came to be felt beyond immediate  operational need.   Indeed, while 
pro-Sultan attitudes among the tribes undoubtedly took time to mature, military 
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intelligence was influential in helping to promote the wider acceptance of the Sultan’s rule 
across the tribal landscape. 
 
The Origins of the Insurgency 
The origins of the  insurgency in Oman and Dhofar and the region of Dhofar in  
particular  lay in the increased resentment among expatriate Dhofari workers in the early 
1960s. Exposed to the siren-like calls of Arab Nationalism and the  emergence of seemingly 
modern, dynamic Republican regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq,   the archaic  and isolationist 
rule of  Sultan Said Bin Taimur by contrast  was antediluvian. Oman lacked  the basic 
infrastructure of a modern state   despite the export of oil in commercial quantities by 1967.  
Radios were banned, there existed few metalled roads while education was limited to a 
select few required to run the country. The emergence therefore of the  Dhofar Liberation 
Front (DLF) in 1964 as a focus of opposition  was therefore  almost inevitable when 
combined with the feelings of total estrangement from the Omani state.   Indeed, lying 
some 600 miles from the capital Muscat, Dhofaris considered themselves distinct from the 
Arabs of Oman  in language, history and culture.6   
     Combining Islamic piety with heartfelt if poorly articulated national aspirations based on 
tribal affinity,   the DLF in which the Bayt Kathir were particularly prominent  rejected  closer 
ties with the rest of Oman in preference for Dhofari  independence.  From 1967 onwards 
however, the programme of the DLF became subservient to, and eventually subsumed by 
the  more radical policies pursued by the PFLOAG. The emergence of PFLOAG was a direct 
result of the establishment in 1967 of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), 
following  the final withdrawal of British troops from Aden and South Arabia  in 1967.  The 
new Republic, dominated by a Marxist  government bent on introducing ‘scientific socialism’ 
to the Arabian peninsula began to exercise increasing influence over the military  and 
political direction of the insurgency in neighbouring Dhofar, an influence that had by 1969 
taken on  a decidedly radical complexion.7  Indeed, as late as 1981 and long after the bulk of 
the insurgents had been vanquished, the PDRY remained beholden enough to its ideological 
affinity to continue its support for the remnants of PFLOAG. 8  
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      Although Anglo-Omani ties  dated back to the late eighteenth century, it was only 
in  1958 that a  treaty  was signed that codified the military relationship between Muscat 
and London. In return for control of air facilities on the island of Masirah and Salalah in 
Dhofar, Britain agreed to help with development of the SAF, an agreement  that  included 
the provision of  some officers on secondment from the British Armed forces with  ‘contract 
officers’  – a politically acceptable term  for mercenaries –  supplementing the rest.   With 
regards to the latter, their quality was decidedly mixed.9   By the late 1960s however, the 
growing magnitude of the insurgency presented the United Kingdom with the prospect of  
two main overlapping  strategic concerns.  The attempt by London  to form  the Trucial 
states of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khamaih and Fujairah 
into a single polity - eventually to become the United Arab Emirates  - would be threatened 
by  the overthrow of a dynastic order in Oman by a movement whose ideological basis was 
anathema to very idea of dynastic states  based on tribal hierarchy. Moreover, in light of the 
material support given to the PDRY by the Soviet Union (as well as the People’s Republic of 
China)  the collapse of the Sultanate and the emergence of a revolutionary regime in its 
wake  could allow Moscow to exercise control over the strategic Musandam peninsula 
guarding the Strait of Hormuz and with it, the capability to interdict Western  oil supplies  in 
times of crisis. 10  
 Against the wider context of the Cold War, such a scenario  informed the 
deliberations of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the immediate aftermath of 
Britain’s withdrawal from Aden, although as a more recent study has argued, the JIC  
‘broadly ascribed the growth of violence to internal actors and conditions’. As such  there 
remained a clear  difference to be drawn between outright ‘external instigation and external 
support’ of the growing  insurgency across Dhofar.  11   Perception of threat was all however 
and certainly, among British officers who served in Oman there  remained  a strong belief 
that should Dhofar fall to PFLOAG, energy supplies to the west would have been ‘seriously 
jeopardised.12   
A sense of urgency now prevailed.  By August 1969 PFLOAG guerrillas had captured 
the administrative centre of Western Dhofar, Rakhyut, and by February 1970 rocket attacks 
against the Royal Air Force station at Salalah had become an occupational hazard of daily 
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life. In stark contrast,  dependence upon the SAF to counter the insurgency was never  
matched by a similar commitment from Sultan  Said bin Taimur to its  modernisation, nor, as 
proved crucial, in using increased  revenues from the production of oil to modernise the 
archaic infrastructure of state.  Most worryingly of all however, he was now estranged from 
the tribes and their leaders such Musalim bin Nufl  across Dhofar whose conservatism had  
hitherto acted as a bulwark against ‘progressive ideologies’.  Amid the absolute poverty of 
Dhofar province however, such tribalism  increasingly came to  question the dominion  of a 
venal  ruler  whose antiquated system of government  now made his removal a matter of 
strategic necessity. 
 
The Intelligence Deficit 
     On 23 July 1970, Sultan Said bin Taimur was removed in a palace coup and replaced by 
his son,  Qabus bin Said.  With power now passing to a more enlightened ruler, the 
narratives surrounding the eventual defeat of the  PFLOAG have come to assume an almost 
deterministic character. In particular,  the role of British Army Training Teams (BATTs) 
formed around elements  of the SAS,  the  Firqat  - the tribal militias  raised and trained   by 
the BATT -  as well as the Civil Action Teams (CATs) have  widely  been credited   as being the 
‘match winners’ of the Dhofar campaign.   The CATs in particular oversaw the drilling of new 
water wells,  introduced   basic medical care  where none had previously existed  as well 
bringing new forms of husbandry  to tribes across Dhofar.   Such use of  what might be 
termed ‘soft power’, has long been seen as critical in delivering victory to the  Qabus bin 
Said.13  
     While not denying the efficacy of such measures, it should not be forgotten  that more 
draconian methods  continued to be sanctioned by the SAF in an effort  to exert pressure on 
those tribal areas where succour, however limited was extended to the enemy or ‘adoo.14  
The need to ensure the legitimacy of  ‘who rules’, as well as  the ‘how of being ruled remains 
key to understanding the ultimate triumph of a dynastic order over the revolutionary ideals 
of PFLOAG and in so doing, confirming the overwhelming tribal identity of the Sultanate.  
The tribal heritage of Qabus himself – his mother was a Dhofari  from the  Bayt Maasheni  – 
certainly helped but such ties by themselves was never enough to decide  Dhofar in favour 
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of the al-Bu-Said dynasty.  Rather, a clear ability to physically  exercise and sustain control  
over the Dhofari interior  was crucial in bringing the tribes over to the government and as 
such, developing  the machinery of an effective intelligence apparatus that could generate 
real-time  information among a tribal society  was crucial to ensuring operational success. 
Here, understanding the subtle but key difference between the ingrained attitudes of a tribe 
such as the Qara with their nomadic tradition , as opposed to its actual behaviour 
determined by circumstance or context  was key to re-establishing government control over 
the tribes in the hinterland of Dhofar. 
  For example, a particular tribe or tribal leader could actually favour the PFLOAG 
guerrillas – support stemming from attitude  -  but the dominance of  the Sultan’s forces in  
a particular area or a recognition that ultimately, the rebel cause was hopeless could   
determined  actual behaviour on the ground,  be it in the form of intelligence sharing or 
indeed,  denying aid or sanctuary  to the ‘adoo. This in turn could determine a decision in 
favour of the SAF.15   Unlike  ‘hearts and minds’ with its emphasis upon  the material 
benefits to be accrued, this is a more sincere  appreciation of engagement with the tribal 
landscape that did not disguise  the efficacy of  harsh measures.  As one former officer 
seconded to SAF  from the Intelligence Corps noted, ‘ There was a conscious dynamic at 
work on the government side which sought to convey this consistent message: if you were  
with the government you would get  money and security. If you were on the insurgent side, 
you would stay  poor and get killed or captured.’16   
It was understanding this important difference that was to become crucial to the 
role of military intelligence in defeating the insurgency in Dhofar (and indeed attempts to 
widen the war to the north of Oman).    In 1970 however, the  intelligence assets that 
existed  across the Sultanate were hardly up to the task. A skeletal intelligence service under 
a seconded officer,  Major John McFrederick who held the staff rank of G2Int did  exist 
within the order of battle of the SAF but until 1970,  it remained staffed by  a mix of  
seconded British officers – known as Desert  Intelligence Officers (DIOs) - on two year fixed 
tours of duty who reported directly up the SAF chain of command  and  Sultan’s Intelligence 
Officers (SIOs) mostly British nationals under direct  contract to the Sultan.  The quality of 
the latter  was decidedly mixed.17   Information was shared, but friction inevitably arose  
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over intelligence collaboration, impacting upon  the development of  an ‘institutional 
intelligence memory’, as both SIOs and DIOs inevitably came and went. Crucially, there 
existed little in the way of a trained indigenous capability upon which    Colonial intelligence 
structures in the past  had traditionally depended.18   Where an SIO did gain useful 
information from the local inhabitants, the mass of material produced was rarely collected 
and collated as part of a recognizable intelligence cycle that could usefully produce 
assessments – political or military -  because of inadequate supporting staff.19  What little 
indigenous intelligence was forthcoming had to be treated with care based  as it was on  
‘paid headmen’ (muqqadam). Their   information could be accurate but equally, was  often 
influenced by the vagaries of tribal rivalries  masquerading as insurgent activity.20   
Even where trust  was  established among the tribes, the peculiarities of tribal 
fidelity often meant that the personal ties of  friendship developed over time between 
intelligence officer and tribesmen  could not easily be transferred to any  replacement. 
Crucial time was often lost as the new intelligence officer looked  to establish his credibility 
with his tribal interlocutor.  Brigadier John Graham, commanding officer  SAF between 1970 
to 1972 claimed as much when he noted  that ‘ Although we had [Sultan’s] Intelligence 
officers living, with their stalwart Omani assistants, near the main centres of population, 
their ability to obtain from a largely unhelpful citizenry accurate information about 
clandestine activities was in truth less than we at the time believed.’21  This is perhaps harsh 
on SIOs in Dhofar who had laboured under extreme difficulties to establish and service 
networks of agents, not least of which was the hostility of bin Taimur himself.22  Even so, the 
need to establish an effective intelligence structure in Dhofar  was now critical if the 
tarnished  legitimacy of the Sultanate among the tribes was to withstand the seemingly 
inexorable rush of Popular Front which by the Spring of 1970 dominated most of the Jebal 
Dhofar and  now appeared to be on the cusp of taking the regional capital Salalah. 
 
 
Building the Intelligence Machinery 
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               In  August 1970 it was agreed that an advance party of approximately 30 men from 
22 SAS would begin to operate in Dhofar in an  advisory  under the cover of BATTs.23   Given 
their later work with the Firqat or tribal irregulars whose members often consisted of 
former ‘adoo, the SAS contribution to the Dhofar campaign has  come to overshadow both 
that of  the SAF but equally the role of British Army Intelligence Corps personnel, five of 
whom, all experienced non-commissioned officers with a command of Arabic  accompanied 
the initial BATT deployment.24   Their  task was to develop an  intelligence ‘cell’  where 
information and reports from SIOs and DIOs ‘up country’  could be collected, collated,  
analysed  and disseminated  - the classic intelligence  cycle  -  that could then inform 
intelligence assessments for SAF and BATT  operations. In time, such intelligence came to  
inform the strategy  of successive SAF commanders in  establishing  a series of heavily 
fortified fences or ‘lines’  on the Jebel Dhofar from 1971 onwards  from which aggressive 
patrolling by the SAF, supported by BATT,  Firqat and later Iranian and Jordanian troops   
incrementally  cleared the ‘adoo from the Jebel  and pushing them towards the border with 
the PDRY.  
  Located  at the SAF base of Umm al Gwaref just outside Salalah,  the intelligence cell 
quickly came to embrace  psychological warfare as part of its remit,  including the 
establishment of Radio Salalah which broadcast  pro-government propaganda  on to the 
Jebal as well  the dropping  leaflets  in areas  where ‘adoo activity was suspected. Early 
versions  of these leaflets extolled  the piety and power of an Islamic order synonymous 
with  the  al-Bu-Said  dynasty, while  raging against  the apostates whose belief in historical 
determinism ran counter to the very fabric of tribal society. Very little was actually said 
regarding the positive benefits to be gained from the restitution of the Sultan’s authority 
across Dhofar although given that  the impact of  civil development had yet to be fully 
realised, the need to define  common cause in terms of the ‘negative’ is perhaps not 
surprising.25    
     The production of timely  operational intelligence however remained  the primary focus 
of the Intelligence  Corps cell and this was derived from a number of sources, not all of them 
secret. Given the dependency of the ‘adoo on the ideological and logistical support of PDRY, 
contextual information  was gleaned  from open source publications such as the Economist 
10 
 
Intelligence Unit and transcripts produced by the BBC Monitoring Service of news bulletins  - 
often exaggerated - from Aden which extolled the martial prowess and political successes of 
the Popular Front.   Such broadcasts were useful in helping to piece together patterns of 
enemy behaviour – for example if a particular attack against RAF Salalah was claimed  
although suspicions that such broadcasts may have  contained orders in code  have  never 
been proved. The actual role played by Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)  remains an area where 
few sources are available but some real-time  information was derived from radio 
communications in the field. Initially, this   was limited since most communication between 
the various ‘adoo groups or ‘regiments’ in Dhofar was by courier. Some groups did 
eventually acquire walkie-talkies  with a limited range while a rudimentary radio net linked  
some of the  ‘adoo on the jebel with their rear headquarters in Hauf, just across the Yemeni 
border. Only after 1976 when   the bulk of the ‘adoo had surrendered were  the potential 
advantages (and risks to the SAF)  of the rebels acquiring   secure radio communications 
demonstrated.  Some 60 hard core guerrillas remained on the  Jebel and tracking their 
movements proved difficult because, as one Intelligence Corps officer noted, these 
guerrillas had  now been schooled in the use of East German ciphers in Aden which could 
not be broken by the SAF.26   
     Other intelligence was gleaned from The Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (SOAF)  which could, 
when tasked,  produce aerial photographs which often compensated for the initially poor 
cartography of the region although airborne reconnaissance was of limited use between 
June to September when the  great Khareef from the Indian ocean enveloped the Dhofar in 
a great mist.  Particular  store was also placed on captured weapons analysis of small arms 
indeed surface to air missiles since  serial numbers could often disclose both the origin and 
quantity of a  weapons system in the hands of PFLOAG and from this, give some indication 
of  their numerical strength in  particular areas and the threat that this may pose to SAF 
operations.27   
      The bulk of the  information gained  by the Intelligence Corps personnel was however 
derived from human intelligence sources (HUMINT), most notably informers and of  crucial 
importance, surrendered enemy personnel (SEPs). It was a potentially rich source  of 
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information but as Brigadier  David Venn  who, as a Captain in the Intelligence Corps,  served 
in Dhofar between 1971-72  noted: 
Previous SIOs had collected a mass of local information but, having no staff had been able to 
do little more than file away their reports in score files. This was where the Int. Cell (or 
spooks as they were universally known) came in. Their first task was to go through the mass 
of back reports and produce basic intelligence files on enemy orbat [order of battle], 
personalities, area briefs, re-supply and the rest.28 
The importance of the cell cannot be overstated   since it marked for the first time 
the emergence of a proper, efficient  intelligence cycle and in the process,  did much to 
erode suspicions that had previously marked functional  relations between DIOs and SIOs.  
This in turn hastened the flow of operational and tactical intelligence to SAF units in the 
field.   Nowhere was this pooling of information more important than in sharing access to 
the informers  or ‘Freds’ a nomenclature borrowed from the ongoing ‘Troubles’ in Northern 
Ireland. For Venn and his successors seconded to work at Brigade Headquarters, the Freds 
offered  the best opportunity  to gain  hard intelligence on ‘adoo activity on the Jebel that 
would otherwise have been denied to British  officers. Indeed,  reliance on the ‘Freds’  was 
accentuated by the complete lack of any  intelligence from SAF head quarters in Muscat or 
the newly formed Oman Intelligence Service (OIS) -  later to become the Oman Research 
Department (ORD) after 1974 -  which mainly dealt with political intelligence across Oman.  
When viewed from the narrow perspective of operations in Dhofar, one Intelligence Corps 
officer noted that the OIS  were ‘lounge lizards’ and consumers, not givers  of intelligence.’29  
The tasking  of Freds was carefully co-ordinated with  the SIO in Salalah  supported by a 
Grade 3 Staff Officer (GSO3), usually a seconded Captain from the Intelligence Corps whose 
remit came to embrace both dealing with SEPs and helping to organise the  Firqat.30    All 
intelligence  activity was directed from   a building in Salalah  that soon earned the Arabic  
sobriquet Bayt  Siyaasee  (the spies or spooks house) from which  the various ‘Freds’, having 
been briefed  were despatched to the hinterland and in particular, the area around the Jebel 
Qarra where much of  the ‘adoo activity originated.    
     Other more instinctive means to generate information and sources certainly reflected the 
tribal essence of  this  conflict, an essence that underscored the  importance of behavioural 
support in generating intelligence: food security.  Access to regular supplies of food was to 
become an increasing problem   facing the guerrillas, particularly after 1971.  The SAF 
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established a series of permanent bases on the Jebel from which offensive operations grew 
exponentially and which allowed  the establishment of a series static lines  designed to both 
interdict their supply routes  and overtime push the ‘adoo backwards  towards the Yemeni 
border. Denial of regular food supplies food was therefore of critical importance  in lowering 
enemy morale, forcing them increasingly to rely either  on the goodwill of sympathetic 
tribes on the Jebel for sustenance or where necessary, to forcibly expropriate food supplies  
from Jebalis as real hunger began to bite.  
     Many Jebalis, particularly the Qara  relied heavily upon upon a single government run 
shop in Salalah from which the basic staples of beans, rice and meat could be bought at 
subsidised prices. With the recently established ‘Leopard’ Line  - in effect a large defensive 
barrier running from the coast, across the Jebel and towards the border with Saudi Arabia  -    
now interrupting regular food convoys from Yemen reaching ‘adoo held territory, 
particularly in the east of Dhofar, the decision  was taken by SAF  in April 1971 to exploit this 
potential vulnerability.  It was announced that the store in Salalah  would be closed for one  
month. Jebalis were able to stockpile supplies sufficient to feed their families  but no more. 
The quantity of  supplies carried by any one Jebali were checked on leaving Salalah to 
ensure the sufficiency principle was being applied. Underpinning the whole endeavour was 
the introduction of a  new currency Riyal Saidi that  now replaced the old Adeni pound  that 
had remained legal tender across Dhofar and was freely available still in South Yemen. 31  
     The extent to which this produced the desired results could be seen not only   in the 
exponential rise of SEPs now surrendering to the  SAF, driven by hunger off the jebel   but   
in the quality of intelligence reaching HQ Dhofar Brigade detailing time, location and size of 
resupply convoys, usually by camel  to ‘adoo held areas as the  impact of the food embargo 
began to have visceral effects.  For example, a  report from one SIO  dated  15 February 
1972  and based on information from  a Fred codenamed ‘Vittel’  disclosed   the impact that 
scarcity of food was now having upon some 'adoo.  
All adoo [sic] are tired and hungry and most of them feel unwell as a result of having to rely 
on a diet which is a) deficient and b) mainly meat…Once again adoo ORs (other ranks) are 
arguing with their leaders, saying that without an adequate diet they cannot be expected to 
fight. They also say that they ought at least to be given leave to go to HAUF so that they can 
have a square meal. 32  
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All SEPs were subject to detailed questioning by the Intelligence Corps cell who knew 
only too well that much of their information was of a time sensitive nature and required 
immediate action if it was to be on any wider operational use.33  For example, knowing the 
total number of camels in any given convoy, as well as supply routes  could at least give an 
indication of the volume of material  reaching the four main PFLOAG operational areas from 
which a reliable estimate  regarding their capabilities, if not their intended targets could be 
discerned.34 Equally, where timely information was available, air strikes could be called 
upon such convoys, although the arrival of the great Khareef  placed seasonal   limitations 
on this method of interdiction. 35  
  Yet while an increase in the volume of information gleaned from the likes of  ‘Vittel’   
now shaped  assessments of the capabilities and intent of the enemy, this does not 
necessarily support the contention that the Jebalis   were   being won over by the largesse of 
Sultan Qabus in the form of freshly dug wells,  medical clinics and so forth  that had begun 
to be appear on the Jebel.  While welcome,  such projects remained relatively few in 
number  and were meant more as a demonstration of future  intent than an immediate  
panacea to the social and economic  ills facing the tribes. Moreover, where new wells were 
sunk in a particular area, the dominant tribe was often warned that should it be discovered 
later that  succour  was freely given to the ‘adoo , this  new source of water would be simply 
destroyed.36  It demonstrated the extent to which, irrespective of attitude, the carrot and 
sticks associated with determining behavioural support was beginning to shape the human 
terrain in favour of the government forces.   
     Of course, the rebel cause   was not helped  by dissension within the ranks of 
PFLOAG itself at a time when the SAF had been  at its most vulnerable and the legitimacy of 
Qabus yet to be consolidated.  PFLOAG ignored the classic Maoist dictum of working with 
and among the people, rather than imposing a new, stridently secular order from the outset  
that  denied agency to an indigenous  sense of tribe or indeed religious belief.       When 
combined with the harsh treatment meted out to tribes on the Jebel whose fidelity to the 
cause was suspect  –  reports of summary executions had already  begun to reach the SIO in 
Salalah  by the summer of 1970 –  cracks began to  appear among PFLOAG members. The 
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critical moment occurred in the so called Eastern Area of the Jebal in September 1970 when 
resentment over the harsh methods adopted by  ‘political commissars’ attached to the 
‘adoo  led to the bloody repression of disaffected tribesmen, many of whom had been 
former members of the DLF.37   The resulting willingness of increasing numbers to return to 
the Sultan’s embrace was no doubt amplified by the general amnesty offered to former DLF 
and PFLOAG members by Qabus as well as the  attendant financial incentives of up to OR 
500 available for the surrender of automatic weapons. As a result,  between September 
1970 and March 1971, some 201 PFLOAG turned themselves over to government forces as 
SEP.  This attempt to ‘break down tribalism before the people were ready for it’, was 
regarded by one intelligence officer as the critical factor  in turning the tribes against the 
‘adoo  although this did not necessarily  translate into  wholehearted support for the new 
Sultan.38 
By 1972 however,  PFLOAG was clearly on the defensive.  SEPs, many of whom had 
held influential positions within the movement , increasingly painted a picture of low unit 
morale among the ‘adoo  in particular areas. Until his defection, Ali Salim Tamaan was 
quarter master for the guerrillas  what was termed the Ho Chi Minh sector of operations. 
His debriefing by Intelligence Corps personal again revealed   hunger  to be an increasing 
problem among the guerrillas with concomitant problems for unit morale.  This was further 
compounded by the growing effectiveness of  two further defensive lines – the Hornbeam 
and later Damavand – which increasingly constrained the ability of the adoo to manoeuvre 
across the Jebel, thereby making them more vulnerable to interception by the SAF.39  
Whether the ‘adoo the fell into the hands of  SAF  were Captured Enemy Personnel (CEPs) or 
SEPs, they were treated for the most part as Prisoners of War and according to the 
strictures of the Geneva convention.   Given the controversy surrounding the status of 
insurgents as  illegal combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan, this was certainly an enlightened 
approach.   Even so,  CEPs  were deemed to be ‘hard core’ by virtue of being captured in 
battle and as such, were usually kept in isolation from other prisoners while undergoing 
interrogation. These captives were transferred to the main SAF HQ of Beit al-Falaj, close to 
Muscat where some were subjected to sleep deprivation.  However unpalatable this 
method now appears in light of  more recent events in the Middle East, it was claimed by 
one informed source that the end justified the means as suspects were soon ‘singing like 
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birds’ and giving up valuable information on the structure, methods and personalities of the 
PFLOAG.40  Once it was assessed that all relevant information had been extracted, they were 
handed over to the Omani authorities. Even if suspected of war crimes against tribes on the 
Jebel, these individuals were tried in civil courts and not by  military  tribunals. Instigating   a  
process of justice based upon formal application of  Sharia law in Omani courts  placed clear 
water between the rule of Sultan Qabus and his father, but equally demonstrated that  a 
new dynastic order was willing to use pardons issued through the courts  and general 
amnesties to further entice ‘adoo away from the PFLOAG fold.41  
    It has often been claimed that  the real worth  of SEP came to be realised in the 
formation of the Firqat, in effect tribal militias that incorporated many SEPs whose whose 
intimate knowledge of the physical topography, as well as the eddies of tribal life on the 
Jebel was deemed invaluable.  The size of each Firqat was not uniform and could range from 
anywhere between 30 to 100 tribesmen, operating with their SAS minders  alongside the 
SAF in an overt capacity to help  interdict  supply routes and lay ambushes and to encourage 
the Jebalis to rally to the Sultan’s cause. Rather than constituting an effective force 
multiplier  however,  the  true value of the Firqat  was more psychological,  demonstrating 
to the uncommitted jebali that PFLOAG was in terminal decline and that Dhofaris, alongside 
Omani Arabs were prepared to nail their colours to the Sultan’s mast.42  The initial attempts 
at least  to cohere the Firqat  into an effective reconnaissance force were not encouraging 
however.  The original idea had been   to recruit mixed units so that ‘no one tribe could use 
the arms and training given to dominate its own part of the Jebel’.43 Raised and trained by 
BATT personnel in the coastal village of Marbat, the Firqat  Salahadin,  was soon wracked  
by internal division as differing  tribal allegiances soon emerged.  ‘ Perhaps too much is 
expected of them’,  noted the British military attaché  for ‘they are proud, grasping wayward 
tribesmen with only inherited native ability and cunning to compensate for a cursory 
military training.’44  Over  time, this view came to be revised  but  for one British officer 
serving on secondment to the  SAF  in 1975 they  remained ‘very unreliable’, their ultimate 
allegiance unknown and were prone to change their minds frequently which usually 
impacted adversely on the conduct of operations that had long been agreed upon. 45 
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It soon became clear that if the concept of the Firqat was to have any currency, they 
would have to exist as  homogenous units and operate within their own tribal domains.46  As 
Captain Alan Abbott, seconded from the  Intelligence Corps to work as the resident GSO 3 
Dhofar Brigade between 1975 and 1977  noted of his experience of the Firqa, ‘ They were 
very good for controlling an area once the enemy had left it, but we never got much (or any) 
hard predictive intelligence from them.47   It was not unknown for individuals to return back 
to the enemy fold or if on patrol,  to claim a negligent discharge of a round to forewarn any  
‘adoo in the area  - often from their own tribe  - of an SAF presence.  Concerns were also 
expressed that these militias should not become an alternative power base across Dhofar  
all too willing to challenge the SAF and the Sultan himself once  PFLOAG had been defeated. 
By 1972  therefore it was agreed that the total number  of tribesman in the Firqat  should 
not exceed 700.  These  suspicions aside, this was also dictated by the cost of arming and 
equipping such numbers at a time when the SAF was itself undergoing expansion and re-
equipment.  In truth, the real value of the Firqat  was perhaps realised in a negative sense;  
that of  providing an outlet  for controlling  primordial loyalties of SEPs  that might still have 
challenged the dominion of Qabus.  But  in the case of one such individual, the information 
he now gave was crucial in preventing the war spreading beyond the confines  Dhofar to the 
north of Oman: Operation Jason. 
 
A Close Run thing 
In October 1972, a  SEP identified a  suspected PFLOAG member, Mohammed Talib  
walling through the main souk in  Muscat who reported his sighting to his  handler, a 
member of the Intelligence Corps. Placed under surveillance  Talib, was eventually arrested 
and interrogated on 18 December. While  at first claiming to have been studying  in Beirut, 
he eventually  revealed that he had in fact been in operating in the north of Oman for over a 
year, preparing a ‘second front’ in an attempt to relieve pressure on the 'adoo following 
their severe losses at the Battle of Mirbat in July 1972. He went on to disclose  that PFLOAG 
had established contact with the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG) in Northern Oman  whose various cell members both 
inside Oman and  across the border in the UAE numbered over 80 and included Omani 
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officers serving in the SAF.  Large quantities of arms and ammunition  had also been  
smuggled into  Oman via the coast  that, if distributed to cell members, would have led to a 
campaign of terror being launched across the north of Oman over the new year period 
1972-73.48  This campaign  entailed attacks on commercial and military targets but perhaps 
of greater importance, the assassination of identified intelligence officials – including 
seconded Jordanian officers serving in intelligence as well as the SAF -  and  their contacts. 
In  effect this  would have  blinded the intelligence effort in northern Oman,  making it 
easier for PFLOAG to ease pressure upon its faltering guerrilla campaign in Dhofar by 
expanding its struggle across the Sultanate.49  Much the same tactics had been adopted by 
the  NLF in Aden who had, by 1967 , destroyed any effective humint capability the Federal 
authorities may have once possessed.50  
           On December 23 1972, ‘ Operation Jason’  was launched to apprehend over 40 
suspects   identified by Talib.  Politically, the seconded officers from the Intelligence Corps  
were taken aback by the social profile of  those involved in the NDFLOAG cells. The Omani 
officers aside, they also included teachers seconded to the SAF, officials of the Oman 
Gendarmarie.51  Another member of the cell was revealed as the been the driver to the 
director of the OIS, Brigadier Malcolm Dennison. As such DIOs and Intelligence Corps 
personnel involved in the arrests deliberately withheld details of Operation Jason from their 
OIS colleagues fearing the widespread penetration of the service.   Opposition to a dynastic 
order dependent upon British tutelage, rather than any avowed support for a new Socialist 
order provided the dominant rationale for many to align themselves with PFLOAG.   
     The British Ambassador  to Muscat, Donald Hawley, impressed upon the Foreign 
Secretary Douglas-Home  how ‘close run’ the discovery of the organisation had been. 
Indeed, it had been  happenstance rather than patient counter-intelligence work that had  
uncovering the network and alerted authorities in Muscat to the attempt by PFLOAG to 
expand the war beyond the Dhofar.  As Hawley noted, ‘ Oman’s own  intelligence 
organisation urgently requires strengthening on the civil side’. 52   Such sentiment certainly 
echoed the views of new  CSAF, Major General Timothy Creasy who  noted that the sheer  
numbers rounded up  under ‘Operation Jason’ lay beyond the limited ability of either the 
OIS or indeed the SAF to interrogate effectively or indeed efficiently.53 
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     Creasy now turned  to London for help in supplying the requisite  expertise  and 
equipment needed to undertake interrogations.  This request caused much inter-
departmental soul-searching in Whitehall,  the FCO  proving reluctant to allow British 
Service personnel on secondment to the SAF to become involved in actual interrogations. 
This sensitivity was informed by recent disclosures  surrounding British interrogation 
techniques in Northern Ireland and the desire by the Heath Government to ensure that 
London’s support for the Sultan remained as discreet as possible. The FCO were only too 
aware however that such a request could only have been made with the blessing of the 
Sultan and to withdraw or withhold British expertise would be damaging to Anglo-Omani 
Relations.54  As one official noted, if meeting requests for such aid  by the Sultan fell short of 
participation in ‘interrogation procedures which we ourselves are using in Northern Ireland’, 
it would by default question the moral efficacy of those self-same methods being used by 
the British  in Ulster.55 
    In a telegram sent on  4 January 1973  Hawley went some way to  qualify the 
nature of the support  sought by the CSAF. Creasy wanted two officers from the Intelligence 
Corps sent to Muscat to collate and administer information gleaned from the interrogations, 
assistance that would help expedite a more integrated appreciation of the 
PFLOAG/NDFLOAG structure without having to rely on the sparse number of  SIOs upon 
whom already heavy demands were already being made in Dhofar.56   Douglas-Home 
initially balked at the request,  suggesting instead that the Saudis or Iranians be called upon 
to conduct the interrogations. This in turn provoked Hawley to remind him that the 
methods of the Saudis were ‘notorious’,  in sharp contrast to those methods employed by 
British seconded and contract officers which were described by the British military attaché 
to Muscat, Colonel Courtney Welch as being ‘conducted in a most gentlemanly manner’. In a 
despatch to London on 6 January, Welch noted that while much information had been 
gleaned from those arrested, details of PFLOAG contacts in other countries and future 
intention had ‘not been forthcoming’. He continued: 
If the Omani security authorities and this means SAF are to capitalise on this important 
break through against subversion/armed revolt, then the missing information that an 
interrogation centre with its proper system of questioning, recording, collating can produce 
could be critical. For instance, we know pistols were brought in with the arms. None of 
these have been recovered.  We  believe they have been distributed. Imagine the furore if 
19 
 
one or two are used by PFLOAG hotheads to assassinate Europeans in the Muttrah suq….If 
the war in Dhofar is to be prosecuted successfully, the North Oman must be kept quiet at 
this moment.  A second front here could bring SAF to its literal  knees  with unfortunate 
repercussions, the least of which would be a request for more British aid.  57 
 
     In the event, the Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, approved the request for loan 
personal to help with the administration of the interrogation centre and to  initiate Omani 
officers in British interrogation techniques. The loan agreement  was finite however, it being 
restricted to  a period of just one month. 58  Even so, the arrest of further conspirators soon 
after in the UAE suggests that the loan of these British intelligence officers was crucial to 
forestalling any recrudescence of PFLOAG cells in north Oman and beyond.59  Forty  of those 
arrested in the initial stages of  Operation Jason were sentenced to death after a brief trial. 
Of that number, 22 had their sentences commuted to various terms of imprisonment. The 
rest, including  six army officers were all executed by firing squad on three consecutive days 
in late June 1973.  Such efficient, if bloody expression of Omani justice was in  marked  
contrast to the fortuitous circumstances that had led to  the discovery of the conspirators. 
Indeed, after  ‘Operation Jason’,  Military Intelligence  came to exercise  increasing influence 
across the nascent  intelligence structures of the Sultanate that by  1975 (see appendix 1),  
had  as much to do with ensuring   the future longevity of the al-Bu-Said dynasty as ensuring 
the successful prosecution of the COIN campaign in Dhofar. 
 
Conclusion 
     Drawing exact parallels between the conduct of recent COIN campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan  with events in Dhofar and Oman  over three decades ago  should be avoided. 
After all, it was an insurgency out of the sight and mind of a global audience, contained 
within a relatively small area, rural for the most part  in nature and where coherence 
marked alliance politics between London and  Muscat. Even so, its echoes still have a 
discernible resonance. Understanding the tension between support derived from 
preference or attitude, an support  derived from contextual behaviour    among a target 
population,   knowing both how to exploit that support as well as  the limits of exploitation, 
and  how in turn  how the information derived can and should determine the role and use of   
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intelligence  provides a contemporary compass of sorts when the contours of good 
governance remain  conspicuous by their absence.      
     In Dhofar, suborning the tribes was crucial to the survival of a dynastic order that had, 
before 1970, increasingly alienated itself from the very structures it needed  to survive, let 
alone endure.  In its ability to connect  with  the tribal terrain and free from the lassitude of 
a styptic regime, military intelligence  played an  important role, hitherto overlooked, in 
ensuring both  the acceptance and longer term legitimacy of the Sultanate across Dhofar.  
The influence  of military intelligence in this conflict was often personal, the links between 
some SIOs and ‘Freds’ in particular developing a bond that went beyond the purely 
instrumental.  But perhaps the final word on any  lessons learnt should be left to Lt Col. Alan 
Abbott who served as the  intelligence officer for Dhofar Brigade  between 1975-1977. 
Reflecting on his experience  he noted that:  
[T]he nature of the political and military threat changes very quickly. Hence, what one 
person thinks was important during one tour of duty can seem alien, or less relevant to 
someone on a different tour a year later. Of course you have to derive lessons, but on 
operations you always have to think forwards not backwards. But the human and 
geographic landscape does not change. The value of understanding the  local tribal society 
(alongside the nature of the ground and the importance of logistics) were lessons learnt [ 
previously] in Aden, Radfan the Jebel Akhdar campaigns. I think that this is the abiding 
aspect worth focusing on, rather than trying to draw transitory lessons from particular 
battles fought 20,10, 5 or even one year earlier.60 
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